What Drives the Urban Wage Premium? Evidence along the Wage Distribution [WP] by Matano, Alessia & Naticchioni, Paolo
 Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública Document de Treball 2012/03, 31 pàg. 
Research Institute of Applied Economics Working Paper 2012/03, 31 pag. 
 
Grup de Recerca Anàlisi Quantitativa Regional Document de Treball 2012/02, 31 pàg. 
Regional Quantitative Analysis Research Group Working Paper 2012/02, 31 pag. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“What Drives the Urban Wage Premium? Evidence  
along the Wage Distribution” 
 
 
 
Alessia Matano and Paolo Naticchioni 
 
 
 
 
 Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                          Working Paper 2012/02, pàg. 2 
Regional Quantitative Analysis Research Group               Working Paper 2012/01, pag. 2 
 
 
 
WEBSITE: www.ub-irea.com • CONTACT: irea@ub.edu
WEBSITE: www.ub.edu/aqr/ • CONTACT: aqr@ub.edu
Universitat de Barcelona 
Av. Diagonal, 690 • 08034 Barcelona 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Research Institute of Applied Economics (IREA) in Barcelona was founded in 2005, as a 
research institute in applied economics. Three consolidated research groups make up the 
institute: AQR, RISK and GiM, and a large number of members are involved in the Institute. 
IREA focuses on four priority lines of investigation: (i) the quantitative study of regional and 
urban economic activity and analysis of regional and local economic policies, (ii) study of public 
economic activity in markets, particularly in the fields of empirical evaluation of privatization, the 
regulation and competition in the markets of public services using state of industrial economy, 
(iii) risk analysis in finance and insurance, and (iv) the development of micro and macro 
econometrics applied for the analysis of economic activity, particularly for quantitative 
evaluation of public policies. 
 
IREA Working Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage 
discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. For that 
reason, IREA Working Papers may not be reproduced or distributed without the written consent 
of the author. A revised version may be available directly from the author. 
 
 
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IREA. Research 
published in this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional 
policy positions. 
 What Drives the Urban Wage Premium? 
Evidence along the Wage Distribution 
 
 
Alessia Matano* and Paolo Naticchioni† 
 
 
 
January 2012 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper aims at disentangling the role played by different theoretical explanations 
in accounting for the urban wage premium along the wage distribution. We analyze 
the wage dynamics of migrants from low-to-high-density areas in Italy, using quantile 
regression and individual panel data to control for the sorting of workers. The results 
show that skilled workers enjoy a higher wage premium when they migrate (wage 
level effect), in line with the agglomeration externalities explanation, while unskilled 
workers benefit more from a wage premium accruing over time (wage growth effect). 
Further, investigating the determinants of the wage growth effect in greater depth, we 
find that for unskilled workers the wage growth is mainly due to human capital 
accumulation over time, consistently with the “learning” hypothesis, while for skilled 
workers it is the “coordination” hypothesis that matters.   
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1. Introduction♠ 
The existence and extent of the urban wage premium have been widely 
investigated in the spatial economic literature, and various different theories have 
been proposed. The most widely accepted explanation refers to urbanization 
externalities in terms of reduced transport costs, technology and knowledge 
spillovers, cheaper inputs and proximity to consumers (Glaeser, 1998, Kim, 1987, 
Ciccone and Hall, 1996). According to this theoretical framework, workers moving 
to cities should immediately experience wage level increases, while those leaving 
cities should experience wage losses (wage level effect). More recently, a “learning” 
explanation has been proposed, i.e. in cities human capital accumulation is faster 
(Moretti, 2004). In this framework, workers moving to cities will only experience 
wage increases over time (wage growth effect), while those leaving cities will not 
necessarily suffer wage losses. Another explanation that entails the possibility of a 
wage growth effect being generated is the “coordination” hypothesis, since cities 
enhance the probability of a better match between workers and firms, and this 
probability increases with the time spent in cities (Kim, 1990, Yankow 2006). 
Furthermore, the literature has also pointed out the importance of controlling for 
the sorting of workers, since the urban wage premium could be the outcome, at 
least partially, of skilled workers being sorted into cities (Combes et al. 2008, Mion 
and Naticchioni, 2009, Matano and Naticchioni, 2011).  
From the empirical point of view, the first paper that discussed and tested the 
role played by the different explanations is Glaeser and Marè (2001), which 
analyzes the determinants of the urban wage premium in the US using data from 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) and the 1990 US census. In particular, the authors analyze the 
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migration flows from rural-to-urban areas (and vice versa), in order to disentangle 
the wage growth effect from the wage level effect. Glaeser and Marè (2001) also 
perform fixed effects estimates to control for the sorting of workers. Their results 
show that a non-negligible part of the urban wage premium accrues to workers 
over time and is retained when they leave cities, consistently with the wage growth 
explanation. Nonetheless, the authors also find evidence of the wage level effect.  
More recently, other papers have extended the analysis of Glaeser and Marè 
(2001) to investigate further the determinants of wage growth in cities, focusing on 
the within- and between-jobs wage growth components which represent a proxy of 
the “learning” and “coordination” hypothesis (Yankow, 2006, Wheeler, 2006, 
Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2011).  
The original contribution offered by this paper lies in extending to the whole 
wage distribution the analysis of the role played by the different theoretical 
explanations in accounting for the urban wage premium, which represents an 
unexplored field of research in the spatial economic literature, to the best of our 
knowledge.  
We make use of the Italian employer-employee INPS (the Italian Social Security 
Institute) database, from 1986-2003. In the first part of the paper we analyze the 
wage dynamics of migrants from low-to-high- and high-to-low-density provinces, 
by means of a quantile regression approach. Moreover, since previous empirical 
studies showed that the sorting of workers captures a significant part of the impact 
of spatial externalities on wages, both at the conditional mean (Combes et al. 2008, 
Mion and Naticchioni, 2009) and along the wage distribution (Matano and 
Naticchioni, 2011), the analysis takes into account the workers’ unobserved 
heterogeneity by carrying out quantile fixed-effect estimations.  
Our analysis shows that for skilled workers, i.e. those at the 90th percentile of the 
wage distribution, most of the urban wage premium accrues immediately after 
moving from a low- to a high-density province, consistently with the wage level 
effect, while for unskilled workers, i.e. those at the 10th percentile, the wage 
premium takes place mainly over time, consistently with the wage growth level 
effect.  
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Since our analysis suggests that the wage growth effect plays a role for both 
skilled and unskilled workers, in the second part of the paper we focus on the 
drivers of the wage growth effect, i.e. on disentangling the “learning” from the 
“coordination” explanation. We consider the sample of migrants from low-to-high-
density provinces after migration, using quantile fixed effects regressions. As a 
proxy for between-jobs wage growth we use the job-change dummy (as in Baum 
Snow and Pavan, 2011), while as a proxy for within-job wage growth we use the 
job tenure variable (Topel, 1991). Once controlled for sorting, our findings show 
that skilled workers benefit more from better matching opportunities in cities, 
enjoying greater returns to job changes. As for unskilled workers, they benefit more 
from higher human capital accumulation, i.e. greater returns to tenure, once in 
cities. Similar results are derived using the sample of ‘stayers’ in low- and high-
density provinces. This suggests that the wage dynamics detected for the migrants 
can be extended to different groups of workers in the economy, thereby reassuring 
about the possible endogeneity of the migration choices. 
Our results clearly bring out the importance of investigating the determinants of 
the urban wage premium along the wage distribution, since the relevance of the 
different explanations differs between skilled and unskilled workers. Further, it is 
also worth stressing that taking into account the whole wage distribution affords 
new insights that prove more revealing than when conventional measures of skills 
are applied, such as educational levels.1   
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review the theoretical 
and empirical literature on the urban wage premium. In Section 3, we describe the 
data, define the spatial variable and present some descriptive statistic while Section 
4 sets out the empirical analysis and discusses the main results. The conclusions are 
drawn in Section 5. 
 
                                                 
1 For instance, according to the 1996 data of the European Community Household Panel, almost 
50% of Italian graduates were not employed in the top quartile of the wage distribution, and 
around 20% had a wage lower than the median. This suggests a substantial heterogeneity across 
graduates, and in general for all educational levels, heterogeneity that can be better detected by 
investigating the whole wage distribution.  
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2. Related Literature 
The urban wage premium has always been a core issue in spatial economic 
literature, at both the theoretical and empirical level. From the theoretical point of 
view, the different explanations can be summarized in the following categories: 
agglomeration economies, i.e. gains in productivity and reduced costs for firms 
located in areas of dense economic activity due to lower transportation costs, lower 
inputs costs, knowledge and technology spillovers between firms, proximity to 
consumers, etc. (Ciccone and Hall, 1996, Kim, 1987, Glaeser, 1998); the “learning” 
mechanism, i.e. cities enhance the accumulation of human capital because of, for 
instance, face-to-face interactions, particularly among skilled people whose 
presence is more concentrated in cities (Glaeser, 1999, Moretti, 2004, Glaeser and 
Resseger, 2010); the “coordination” hypothesis, i.e. urban density facilitates the 
matching between workers and firms because of a higher rate of job openings, 
which increases the probability of receiving a better offer – a probability that 
increases with the time spent in a dense region (Kim, 1990, Helsey and Strange, 
1990).  
All these explanations can potentially play a role in generating the urban wage 
premium. However, the timing of the urban wage premium differs across 
explanations. In fact, agglomeration economies imply that workers who migrate 
from non-urban to urban areas should enjoy an immediate wage premium (wage 
level effect), while the “learning” and “coordination” hypotheses imply that 
essentially wages in cities increase with time spent in the cities (wage growth 
effect).  
Moreover, the literature has shown that to investigate the extent of wage level 
and wage growth effects properly it is crucial to control for the sorting of high 
ability workers into cities, i.e. skilled workers are attracted by cities, and cities 
make them more productive (Combes et al., 2008, Mion and Naticchioni, 2009, 
Matano and Naticchioni, 2011, Bacolod, Blum and Strange, 2009). 
At the empirical level, the seminal paper is Glaeser and Marè (2001), which 
makes use of US data (1990 census, NLSY and PSID) to analyze the migration flows 
from rural-to-urban areas (and vice versa), in order to distinguish the wage growth 
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effect (essentially interpreted as evidence of human capital accumulation) from the 
wage level effect (agglomeration economies). The authors’ research hypothesis is 
that if the wage growth mechanism alone were at work, workers moving to cities 
would only experience wage growth over time, and would not necessarily suffer 
wage losses when leaving cities. On the other hand, if the wage level effect applied, 
migrants would experience both immediate wage increases after moving to cities 
and wage losses when leaving them. They also perform fixed effects estimates to 
control for the sorting of workers. Their findings show that, apart from the wage 
level effect already emphasized in the literature, the wage growth effect plays an 
important role, which lends support to an explanation in terms of human capital 
accumulation.  
Also Lehmer and Moller (2010) analyze the determinants of the urban wage 
premium in terms of wage level and wage growth effects. They analyze the case of 
Germany using a random sample extracted from the Employment Statistics of the 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB-REG). Their results confirm the existence 
of a sizeable urban wage premium, which is reduced when controlling for firm 
size, suggesting that interregional firm-size differences account for a significant 
part of the urban wage premium. They also point out that the urban wage 
premium is due more to a wage growth effect related to human capital 
accumulation than to a wage level effect, especially for more experienced workers.  
Other related papers have investigated further the main finding emphasized by 
Glaeser and Maré (2001), i.e. the wage growth effect and its determinants. Using 
the NLSY data, Wheeler (2006) focuses on wage growth within and between cities 
in the US. His findings show that, on average, wage growth tends to be positively 
associated with the size of the local market (in terms of resident population, 
population density and industrial diversity). Further, Wheeler (2006) is interested 
in disentangling the role of within-job wage growth, which proxies the “learning” 
mechanism, from that of between-jobs wage growth, which proxies the 
“coordination” effect. He points out that faster wage growth is related to job 
changes rather than within-job wage growth. These findings highlight the fact that 
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cities enhance worker productivity mainly through a process of better matching 
between workers and firms taking place over time.  
Also Yankow (2006) makes use of the NLSY data to show that in the US the 
urban wage premium is due to both wage level and wage growth effects. He then 
analyzes the wage growth related to the between-jobs dynamics in order to shed 
some light on the relevance of the “coordination” hypothesis. He shows that there 
is no statistical difference between urban and non-urban workers in the average 
wage gain from a single job change. However, he finds evidence that in cities there 
is a significantly higher frequency of job changes, entailing a higher cumulative 
wage growth related to job changes. 
Finally, Baum-Snow and Pavan (2011) decompose the city size wage premium 
into its various components using the NLSY data for the US. In particular, they 
develop a structural on-the-job-search model that includes all the relevant 
explanations that affect the urban wage premium (unobserved ability, search 
frictions, quality job matching between workers and firms, human capital 
accumulation and endogenous migration). They investigate the role played by 
these different explanations in small, medium and large cities, finding out that 
human capital accumulation is more important for generating wage premiums 
among large and small cities, while wage level effects are more important among 
medium and small sized cities. In contrast with Wheeler (2006), they claim that 
better matching plays only a minor role in affecting the urban wage premium, as 
well as unobserved heterogeneity.2 
All these studies focus on the analysis of the determinants of the urban wage 
premium evaluated at the conditional mean. The original contribution of this paper 
is to extend the analysis along the whole wage distribution. Some papers have 
already focused on related, but different, distributional/inequality issues. Wheeler 
                                                 
2 Two additional papers can be considered in relation to our analysis. Bleakley and Lin (2007) 
show that one source of the urban wage premium is the difference in the matching 
opportunities between workers residing in cities and those in rural areas. Gould (2007) focuses 
on identification of the causal urban wage premium and develops a structural model that 
accounts for the self-selection of workers moving into cities, showing that cities have no urban 
wage premium to offer to blue-collar workers, while they see the white-collar workers’ 
productivity enhanced. For an in-depth survey on urban wage premium and human capital 
externalities see Heuermann et al. (2010). 
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(2004) uses aggregate data for the US to show that urban density entails a decrease 
in wage inequality. For Germany, Moller and Haas (2003) use a quasi-quantile 
regression approach to evaluate the relationship between density and wage 
differentials at different percentiles of the wage distribution, pointing out that 
density increases wage inequality. While Wheeler (2004) and Moller and Haas 
(2003) make use of aggregate data, Matano and Naticchioni (2011) use individual 
level data for Italy to show that both density and specialization contribute to 
increasing wage inequality, after controlling for the sorting of workers. None of 
these studies, however, investigate the determinants and the underlying 
explanations of the urban wage premium along the wage distribution, which is in 
fact the focus of this paper. 
 
3. Data Description  
We use a panel version of the Italian administrative database provided by INPS 
and elaborated by ISFOL (the Italian Institute for the Development of Vocational 
Training).3 It is an employer-employee dataset, constructed for the period 1986-2003 
by merging the INPS employee information with the INPS employer information 
database.4 The units of the analysis are industrial- (manufacturing and mining) and 
service-dependent workers, both part-time (converted into full-time equivalent) 
and full-time. We focus on standard labor contracts, including both blue and white 
collars. Moreover, we take into account prime-age male workers as in Glaeser and 
Maré (2001) and Mion and Naticchioni (2009), among others. In particular, we 
                                                 
3 The sample scheme of the database follows individuals born on the 10th of March, June, 
September and December and therefore the proportion of this sample in the Italian employee 
population is approximately of 1/90. The panel version was constructed considering only one 
observation per year for each worker. For those workers who have more than one observation 
per year we selected the longest contract in terms of weeks worked. We also eliminated the 
observations below (above) the 0.5th (99.5th) percentile of the wage distribution.  
4 For the information on employers we also make use of the ASIA (“Italian Statistical Archive of 
Operating Firms”) database, provided by ISTAT (the Italian National Institute of Statistics). This 
database has been used since 1999, because the INPS employer database was no longer 
available after 1998. The two databases provide the same set of information (firm size and 
sector). 
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focus on individuals aged between 25 and 49 (when they first enter the database).5 
Further, we consider only those workers that are in the dataset for at least three 
years, in order to get more reliable within estimations.6 By doing so, we eventually 
have an unbalanced panel of 46,822 workers for 457,800 observations. As for 
worker characteristics, the database contains individual information such as age, 
gender, occupation, workplace, worker status (part-time or full-time), real gross 
yearly wage and the number of months, weeks and days worked. For firms, we 
have the plant location (province), the size (number of employees), and the sector.  
We merge the INPS dataset with provincial data on industrial and service 
employment provided by INPS for the period 1986-2003 – our period of analysis. 
Using this latter database, we can define the employment density, which represents 
the proxy for urban agglomeration. It is defined as in Combes (2000), Ciccone and 
Hall (1996), Mion and Naticchioni (2009) and Matano and Naticchioni (2011): 
employment in province p at time t out of the province area in square km. The 
spatial breakdown is hence given by the province (provincia), classified in 95 units.7 
In order to analyze the migrations between high- and low-density provinces, we 
split provinces into low-density (LD) and high-density (HD) on the basis of the 
(time average) median value of the density, computed on individual observations. 
We then define the following groups in order to classify workers’ movements: 
stayers in LD provinces, stayers in HD provinces, migrants from LD to HD 
provinces and migrants from HD to LD provinces. Workers in LD (HD) provinces 
who change job, but remain in an LD (HD) province, are classified as stayers in LD 
(HD) provinces, along with workers that remain in the same job in an LD (HD) 
                                                 
5 We do not consider, as is standard practice in this literature, women and older workers since 
their wage dynamics is in fact often affected by non-economic factors, implying that economic 
and spatial covariates are less relevant in explaining their labor market outcomes (Topel, 1991).  
6 Note that in our sample we consider only workers with observations continuously available, 
i.e. available for consecutive years, since if data are missing for some years it is not possible to 
establish the patterns of worker’s career dynamics. Moreover, we do not consider migrants 
before and after ten years from migration, since we claim that ten years are a sufficient time 
span to investigate the wage dynamics before and after the migration.   
7 The Italian provinces follow the European NUTS3 classification. We make use of 95 provinces, 
which was the number of provinces in the first year of analysis (1986). In recent years the 
number of provinces has risen to 103. Therefore, we reclassified the individuals belonging to the 
new provinces into the corresponding initial 95-province classification.   
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province. Further, if an individual moves more than once between HD and LD 
provinces, he/she may "score" more than once in the analysis.8  
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the different workers’ groups. As 
expected, the average wage of stayers in LD provinces is lower than that of stayers 
in HD provinces, while the average wage for migrants lies in between those of 
stayers in LD and HD provinces, consistently with Mion and Naticchioni (2009). 
Migrants are also generally slightly younger than stayers and are relatively more 
concentrated in white collar occupations, as stayers in HD provinces. Further, 
migrants from LD to HD provinces as well as stayers in HD provinces work in 
larger firms. Finally, stayers in HD provinces and migrants from LD to HD density 
provinces are relatively more concentrated in the service sector, while the other 
groups of workers find greater representation in the industry sector.  
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 The Extent of the Wage Level and the Wage Growth Effect along the Wage 
Distribution.  
We use a quantile regression approach to investigate the role of the wage level and 
the wage growth effect in determining the urban wage premium along the wage 
distribution. Following Glaeser and Marè (2001), we estimate a wage regression 
with dummies that capture the exact path of migration: 
 
 
 
 
where θ refers to the percentile, i to individuals, s to sectors, p to provinces, t to 
time and j stands for the dummies concerning year intervals before (“10 to 5”, “4 to 
                                                 
8 We did not consider workers moving three or more times between LD and HD provinces, who 
in any case account for a very small fraction of the workers in the sample.  
'
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3”, “2 to 1”), after (“1 to 2”, “3 to 4”, “5 to 10”) and for the migration year (“0”)), 
with j є Ti is the individual time span.   
The dependent variable in our regressions is the (log) real gross weekly wage in 
euro.9 As for the variables of interest, hl tjI
−
,  (with j=(-10-5,…,+5-+10)) stands for a 
dummy variable that takes on a value of one when the worker, at time t, moved 
(will move) j years before (after) from a low- to a high-density province, while lh tjI
−
,  
stands for a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the worker, at time t, 
moved (will move) j years before (after) from a high-density to a low-density 
province. Hence, the estimates of hlj
−γ
 and thj −γ  reflect the dynamics of wages before 
or after a move.  
As for the other variables, the term I_Chari,t is a set of observed individual 
characteristics (age, age squared, blue collar dummy) and Firmsizei,t is the proxy for 
firm heterogeneity,10 while φs, λa, δt are sector, area (five macro-areas in Italy: 
Northwest, Northeast, Centre, South and Islands) and time dummies respectively. 
We carry out estimates for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles.  
Table 2 shows the cross sectional quantile regression results. The omitted 
category is ‘stayers in LD provinces’. We also provide the coefficients for the 
stayers in HD provinces. It is worth noting that stayers in HD provinces earn 
significantly more than stayers in LD provinces. This confirms that the bulk of 
wage differences across the space dimension is mainly due to stayers, as 
emphasized by Mion and Naticchioni (2009). Moreover, the urban wage premium 
for stayers in HD provinces with respect to those in LD provinces increases along 
the wage distribution, ranging from 2.3% at the bottom of the wage distribution to 
                                                 
9 Wages have been deflated using the national Consumer Price Index (FOI index, Indice dei 
Prezzi al Consumo per le Famiglie di Operai e Impiegati, ISTAT). The base year is 2002. We do not 
apply cost of living adjustments for two main reasons. First, because we are interested in the 
firms’ willingness to pay higher wages, and not in the location choice of workers. Second, 
because Baum-Snow and Pavan (2011) show that using wages not deflated by cost of living 
does not prove a major problem when working with differenced data. In our analysis this 
consideration applies since we work with deviations from within individual average. 
10 We proxy the firm heterogeneity using the firm size, since firm productivity and wages are 
positively related with firm size (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2006, Krueger and Summers, 1988). 
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5.8% at the top. This means that skilled workers have a greater advantage in 
working in HD areas, consistently with Matano and Naticchioni (2011).11  
Let us now move on to analysis of the groups of migrants, starting from the 
migrants from LD to HD provinces. To begin with, we must point out that using 
quantile regressions allows for better characterization of the wage dynamics of 
migrants, both before and after migration. More specifically, from Table 2 it 
emerges that skilled workers, at the 90th percentile, experience a wage increase 
even before migration, suggesting that the sample of migrants at the 90th percentile 
is positively selected, consistently with the intuitions of Borjas (1987). On the 
contrary, migrants at the 10th percentile represent a negative selection of the 
reference group of workers, since they experience a wage loss before migration. For 
workers at the median, instead, the wage dynamics before migration is not 
statistically different from that of the workers remaining in LD provinces. These 
findings suggests that unskilled workers mainly decide to migrate to a dense 
region after a negative shock in their current job, while for skilled workers the 
migration to dense regions is a tool to improve their already increasing wage 
dynamics. This characterization represents a further value added provided by the 
use of quantile regression.  
As for the extent of the wage level and wage growth effect along the wage 
distribution, we begin with some considerations on the analysis of average wages, 
derived by using Ordinary Least Square. It may be noted that the wage level effect 
is quite small (1.2% with respect to a not statistically significant 0.7% just before 
migration) while the greatest part of the wage increase occurs after migration: the 
wage growth effect amounts to 13% (14.2% minus 1.2%). These findings are 
consistent with those of Glaeser and Maré (2001), who emphasize the importance of 
the wage growth effect.   
Similar patterns are derived when considering the median, and this is hardly 
surprising since the distribution of the dependent variable, i.e. the log weekly 
wage, should come fairly close to a symmetric distribution. In particular, it emerges 
that at the median the entire wage premium arises essentially some years after 
                                                 
11 In our analysis we can control for firm size, which represents -according to Lehmer and 
Moller (2010)- one of the main determinants of the urban wage premium.   
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migration (Table 2), since the wage level effect stands at zero (coefficients not 
statistically different from zero just before and after the migration).  
Different and more interesting findings are derived when the tails of the wage 
distribution are taken into account. On the one hand, for workers at the bottom of 
the wage distribution (10th percentile) there is a slight negative wage level effect     
(-1.1%, from -6.1% to -7.2%). Nonetheless, in the years following migration wages 
tend to rise and after 3-4 years these workers earn significantly more than unskilled 
workers in LD provinces (+1.7%); the premium increases further after 5-10 years 
(+5.4%). This is in line with the wage growth hypothesis. 
In the case of skilled workers (90th wage percentile) the pattern is different. In 
fact, the wage level effect is positive and amounts to a non-negligible 2.2% (from 
4.1% to 6.3%). This finding suggests that for skilled workers agglomeration 
economies play a role in determining the urban wage premium. At the same time, 
there is evidence of a significant wage growth effect since the urban wage premium 
tends to increase over time (20% after 5-10 years).12 
As for the migration from HD to LD provinces, it is noteworthy that, regardless 
of the wage percentile considered, there is no evidence of wage losses just after 
migration relative to 1-2 years before, consistently with the wage growth 
hypothesis and in line with Glaeser and Marè (2001). Rather, in some cases there is 
even a slight increase (1-2%).  
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
However, these estimates might be biased since they do not take into account 
the role of the sorting of workers. Actually, part of the wage premium imputed to 
agglomeration economies, as well as human capital accumulation and quality 
matching, could be due to the sorting of skilled workers into cities. In order to 
tackle this issue, we perform fixed effects estimates that allow controlling for 
                                                 
12 Adding up the wage level effect (difference between coefficients just after the migration and 
1-2 years before) and the wage growth effect (difference between coefficients just after the 
migration and 5-10 years after), it comes out that the total increase in wages is of 11.5% for 
workers at the 10th percentile and of 16% for workers at the 90th percentile.  
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individual unobserved heterogeneity (Combes et al., 2008, Mion and Naticchioni, 
2009, Matano and Naticchioni, 2011). 
Since we work in a quantile setting, we make use of the quantile fixed effects 
methodologies proposed by Canay (2011) and Koenker (2004), which yield very 
similar findings (Table 3 and 4).13 We comment on the estimates obtained applying 
the Canay (2011) methodology (Table 3). The omitted category within each group 
of migrants is that of  ‘5 -10 years before the migration’.  
The results in Table 3 confirm that sorting matters. In particular, considering the 
migrants from LD to HD provinces, the difference in coefficients between 1-2 years 
before migration and 5-10 years after generally decreases relative to previous 
estimates, and the reduction is greater at the highest percentiles, consistently with 
Matano and Naticchioni (2011).  
In terms of decomposition between the wage growth and wage level effect, for 
the median and the mean the results differ little from previous ones, i.e. the wage 
level effect remains quite negligible and most of the wage increase occurs over 
time: the wage growth effect is equal to 4.8% at the median (5.5% minus 0.7% just 
after migration) and 5% at the mean (5.8% minus 0.8%).  
Similarly, for low skilled workers the wage premium is essentially due to a wage 
growth effect: there is an increase immediately after migration (+2.1%, from -6.3% 
to -4.2%), but most of the urban wage premium emerges over time (+7.9%, from      
-4.2% to 3.7%). 
Different and indeed interesting patterns emerge for skilled workers (at the 90th 
percentile), since most of the urban wage premium is due to a wage level effect 
(3.9%, from 3.2% to 7.1%), while the wage growth effect accounts only to an 
additional 0.9% wage increase (from 7.1% to 8%).  
It is worth noting that for the group of migrants from LD to HD provinces the 
wage premia after 5-10 years from migration monotonically increase along the 
wage distribution, from 3.7% at the 10th percentile to 5.5% at the median and to 8% 
at the 90th percentile, even if the decomposition between the wage level and wage 
                                                 
13 For a detailed description of these procedures see Matano and Naticchioni (2011), and the 
related papers of Canay (2011) and Koenker (2004) for further details.  
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growth effect differs depending on the percentile considered, as already pointed 
out.14 
As for the migrants from HD to LD provinces, fixed effects estimates generally 
confirm the cross sectional results. In particular there is no evidence of wage losses 
just after migration -relative to 1-2 years before migration- from the median up to 
the 90th percentile (consistently with the wage growth hypothesis), while there is a 
2.1% reduction for the 10th percentile.15  
These findings suggest that while for unskilled workers the determinants of the 
urban wage premium appear to be due mainly to a wage growth effect, and hence 
to the coordination and/or learning explanation, for skilled workers the urban 
wage premium is more the result of a wage level effect related to the agglomeration 
explanation, even if wage growth still plays a role.  
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
 
4.2 Focus on the Wage Growth Effect: Disentangling the “Learning” and the 
“Coordination” Effects along the Wage Distribution 
One of the findings of our paper is that a non-negligible part of the urban wage 
premium is related to a wage growth effect, consistently with Glaeser and Maré 
(2001). As stressed in the literature, the wage growth effect could be the outcome of 
                                                 
14 With fixed effect regressions, when we add up the wage level and the wage growth effect, a 
wage increase of 5% emerges at the 90th percentile (11 percentage points lower than in cross 
sectional estimates) and of around 10% at the 10th percentile (1.5 percentile points lower than in 
cross sectional estimates). This confirms that the sorting of workers affects the extent of the 
urban wage premium, particularly for high skilled workers (Matano and Naticchioni, 2011).  
15 As already stressed in the literature (Glaeser and Maré, 2001, Baum Snow and Pavan, 2011), 
fixed effects estimates have to be taken with some caution since the migrants might be a non-
random sample of the population. This issue has been addressed by using for instance the 
sample of displaced workers (Dustmann and Meghir, 2005; Mion and Naticchioni, 2009). 
However, it has been shown that the sample of displaced workers can either over-  or under- 
represent some characteristics of the original sample and therefore misrepresent the labour 
force (Matano and Naticchioni, 2011). Nonetheless, in the final part of the paper we show that 
the dynamics for migrants and stayers (in LD and HD provinces) do not significantly differ 
from one another, suggesting that our findings can be extended to the whole economy.   
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either faster human capital accumulation (learning) or more efficient job searching 
and matching (coordination). Our aim in this section is to disentangle the roles of 
the “learning” and “coordination” effects.  
To begin with, we focus on the sample of migrants from LD to HD provinces, 
once they have moved into HD provinces. We include variables that are considered 
in the literature as proxy for the within-job wage growth (tenure, using a quadratic 
specification) and for the between-jobs wage growth (dummy for job change, as in 
Baum Snow and Pavan, 2011). We estimate the following regression: 
 
 
 
 
where as before θ refers to the percentile, i to individuals, s to sectors, p to 
provinces, t to time.  
The dependent variable is again the (log) real gross weekly wage in euro. The 
variables of interest are Tenure, Tenure squared, and the dummy Job Change that 
takes the value of 1 when a worker changes job in the corresponding year. All the 
other variables are the same as in the previous section. In Table 5 we set out the 
estimates derived by means of the quantile fixed effect regression methodology 
developed by Canay (2011), to control for the sorting of workers. 
The results show that the impact of within- and between-jobs components on 
wages is not uniform along the wage distribution. In fact, the unskilled workers’ 
wage growth (10th-25th wage percentile) is due mainly to positive –and concave- 
returns to tenure, suggesting that human capital accumulation plays a substantial 
role. Further, the linear coefficient of the returns to tenure decreases along the wage 
distribution, becoming negative at the 75th and 90th percentile, even if the quadratic 
term switches to positive. This suggests that for skilled workers job tenure does not 
contribute positively to wage growth.   
As for the impact of job changes, this is positive for skilled workers (90th 
percentile), suggesting better matching opportunities in dense area, consistently 
with Wheeler (2006), while proving negative for unskilled workers.  
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Combining these findings, it clearly emerges that in dense areas unskilled 
workers advance in their careers by remaining in their jobs, while skilled workers 
benefit by changing jobs.  
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
However, one might argue that the sample of migrants from low-to-high-
density provinces is not representative of the whole economy (Mion and 
Naticchioni, 2009, Baum Snow and Pavan, 2011). For this reason, we carry out the 
same econometric specification -including tenure and job-to-job changes- on the 
sample of stayers in LD and HD provinces (Table 6), i.e. stayers in the sense that 
they remain in the same LD or HD area although they may change jobs within the 
area.16 Since the results derived from the sample of stayers are, as we will see, 
similar to those derived from the group of migrants, our findings may well be 
taken as representative of the whole economy.   
In the group of stayers the returns to tenure in both HD and LD provinces 
decrease along the wage distribution. More specifically, they are positive and 
concave for the bottom part of the wage distribution, and negative and convex for 
the highest part (in HD provinces they become insignificant). Further, the returns 
to tenure for workers in LD provinces are lower than for those in HD provinces, 
and are closer to those related to the group of migrants (table 5). We can therefore 
extend to the sample of stayers the finding derived in the sample of migrants, 
evidencing the fact that the accumulation of human capital over time is the main 
source of the urban wage premium for low skilled workers. More importantly, this 
effect is stronger for stayers in HD provinces than for those in LD provinces, 
suggesting a spatial effect.  
As for the returns to job changes in the group of stayers, they are increasing 
along the wage distribution, as in the group of migrants. Nonetheless, even if the 
trends are similar, again the magnitude differs: in LD provinces, returns to job 
                                                 
16 Note that for this analysis on the group of stayers we cannot consider the employment spells 
of individuals recorded in the database as working as from January 1986, since the formal 
beginning of all these jobs in the INPS database is forced to be January 1986, entailing that the 
tenure variable is left truncated.  
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change are negative at the 10th percentile (-4.1%), and switch to positive at the 90th 
percentile (1.6%); in HD provinces they are negative up to the 25th percentile and 
positive and increasing from the median (0.5%) up to the 90th percentile (3.9%). 
This evidence confirms the hypothesis that for skilled workers the driving force of 
the wage growth effect is the ‘coordination’ explanation, i.e. better matching 
opportunities, and this effect is much stronger in dense areas, revealing that the 
coordination hypothesis is correlated to the density of the local labor market.17  
 
[Table 6 around here] 
 
Moreover, we also verify whether there is a higher incidence of job changes in 
HD provinces, as argued in Yankow (2006), which would entail a greater 
cumulative wage growth. On the evidence of Table 7 the overall job change 
incidence can be seen to be basically the same for the group of stayers in LD 
provinces (11.1%) and for the group of stayers in HD provinces (10.8%), and a 
similar incidence is observed for the group of migrants from LD to HD provinces 
after migration (10.7%). However, since we work in a quantile framework we aim 
at enriching the analysis of Yankow (2006) by investigating whether the differences 
between LD and HD provinces in the incidence of job changes vary along the wage 
                                                 
17
 Our findings are to some extent not consistent with those derived by Baum Snow and Pavan 
(2011). However, there are many differences between the two papers. We consider prime age 
workers while they consider young individuals; we investigate the whole wage distribution 
while they consider the conditional mean; we use tenure as proxy for human capital 
accumulation while they use experience (we cannot recover the experience variable in our data), 
we work on Italian data while they investigate the US labour market. To make the two 
approaches more similar from a methodological point of view, we decided to carry out a 
robustness check using the age variable, which can approximate experience in the labour 
market. In particular, we use a specification including the linear term of age separated for 
workers in LD and HD provinces, and the quadratic term in common between LD and HD 
provinces, exactly as in Baum Snow and Pavan (2011) for the experience variable. In the 
specification we also include the job change dummies and all the covariates of Table 6. When 
focusing on the conditional mean, the results come closer to Baum Snow and Pavan (2011): the 
age coefficients are slightly higher in HD provinces, suggesting that human capital 
accumulation increases in dense areas. As for the returns to job change, the coefficients are 
negative and very close to zero, even if slightly less negative in HD provinces. This suggests 
that at the mean the coordination factor plays a very negligible role, as in Baum and Snow 
(2011). However, when considering the two tails of the distribution our findings are still 
confirmed: skilled workers benefit more from job changes (even if the differences with respect 
to LD provinces workers are now reduced) while unskilled workers benefit more from human 
capital accumulation. These estimates are available upon request.  
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distribution. To do so we compute the incidence of job changes for the four 
quartiles of the wage distribution. From Table 7 it emerges that for the first three 
quartiles of the wage distribution there are decidedly negligible differences in the 
incidence of job changes between the groups of stayers in LD provinces, the stayers 
in HD provinces and the LD-HD provinces migrants. Interestingly, for the fourth 
quartile the incidence of job changes for the group of stayers in HD provinces 
(10.3%) is significantly higher than for the group of stayers in LD provinces (8%), 
while an intermediate value is observed for the group of migrants from LD to HD 
provinces (9.3%). This evidence suggests that skilled workers show a higher 
incidence of job change in HD provinces. This also means that for skilled workers 
not only are the returns to each single job change higher in HD provinces (Table 6) 
but also the incidence of job change, suggesting that the cumulative returns to job 
changes are even higher than those shown in Table 6.  
 
[Table 7 around here] 
 
All these findings suggest that for skilled workers the driving force of wage 
dynamics in dense areas is largely a matter of better matching opportunities, while 
for unskilled workers it is within-job growth that plays a major role, in line with 
the learning explanation.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate whether, and if so to what extent, the determinants of 
the urban wage premium, in terms of agglomeration economies, human capital 
accumulation and quality matching, differ along the wage distribution. Having 
controlled for the sorting of workers by means of quantile fixed effect regressions, 
we arrive at the following findings.  
First, the patterns of the urban wage premium are far from homogeneous along 
the wage distribution. In particular, skilled workers enjoy higher wage premiums 
in terms of wage level effect, since most of the urban wage premium arises at the 
time of migration. Thus skilled workers benefit more from agglomeration 
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externalities. For low skilled workers the picture is reversed, since most of the 
urban wage premium arises some years after migration.  
Second, we further investigate the determinants of the wage growth effect in 
dense areas. For both migrants to HD provinces and stayers in LD and HD 
provinces, within-job wage growth is an important driver of the wage growth 
effect for unskilled workers, and this effect is stronger in HD provinces: unskilled 
workers benefit more from human capital accumulation in dense areas. On the 
contrary, for skilled workers it is more the between-jobs wage growth that matters 
and this effect is stronger in HD provinces for both stayers and migrants from LD 
to HD provinces: in dense areas there are better matching opportunities for skilled 
workers. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for stayers and migrants
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Real Weekly Wage 6.00 0.38 4.25 8.73 6.16 0.44 4.25 9.23
Age 41.92 8.07 25 66 42.27 8.09 25 67
Blue Collar 0.70 0.46 0 1 0.57 0.50 0 1
White Collar 0.30 0.46 0 1 0.43 0.50 0 1
Firm Size 4.61 2.69 0 12.11 5.26 2.77 0 12.11
North West 0.22 0.41 0 1 0.52 0.50 0 1
North East 0.24 0.43 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1
Centre 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.18 0.39 0 1
South 0.22 0.41 0 1 0.07 0.25 0 1
Island 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.00 0.00 0 0
Industry 0.65 0.48 0 1 0.58 0.49 0 1
Services 0.35 0.48 0 1 0.42 0.49 0 1
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Real Weekly Wage 6.14 0.50 4.41 8.87 6.13 0.50 4.34 8.74
Age 40.63 7.89 25 66 40.56 7.99 25 67
Blue Collar 0.54 0.50 0 1 0.54 0.50 0 1
White Collar 0.46 0.50 0 1 0.46 0.50 0 1
Firm Size 5.35 2.75 0 12.07 5.12 2.56 0 12.02
North West 0.34 0.47 0 1 0.37 0.48 0 1
North East 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.24 0.43 0 1
Centre 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.19 0.40 0 1
South 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.16 0.36 0 1
Island 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.04 0.19 0 1
Industry 0.60 0.49 0 1 0.63 0.48 0 1
Services 0.40 0.49 0 1 0.37 0.48 0 1
Source: Panel INPS (processed by ISFOL) data. Real Weekly Wage and Firm Size are in logarithm. Number of observations in
brackets.
Stayers Low Density (199,282) Stayers High Density (218,804)
Migrants Low-High Density (19,845) Migrants High-Low Density (19,869)
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q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 mean
0.023*** 0.023*** 0.035*** 0.049*** 0.058***  0.047***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]  [0.001]
0.018** 0.010** 0.005 0.003 0.010 0.025***
[0.008] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.010]  [0.005]
-0.006 0.003 0.015** 0.024*** 0.026**  0.028***
[0.008] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.012]  [0.006]
-0.061*** -0.020*** -0.004 0.021*** 0.041***  0.007
[0.008] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.010]  [0.005]
-0.072*** -0.026*** -0.001 0.028*** 0.063***  0.012*
[0.015] [0.008] [0.009] [0.010] [0.013]  [0.006]
-0.021*** 0.000 0.031*** 0.078*** 0.094***  0.057***
[0.008] [0.007] [0.004] [0.006] [0.015]  [0.006]
0.017** 0.028*** 0.062*** 0.113*** 0.159***  0.096***
[0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.012] [0.021]  [0.007]
0.054*** 0.054*** 0.099*** 0.158*** 0.201***  0.142***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.012] [0.013]  [0.007]
0.030** 0.035*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.062***  0.054***
[0.013] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.013]  [0.006]
0.000 0.016*** 0.040*** 0.053*** 0.057***  0.050***
[0.008] [0.006] [0.005] [0.010] [0.008]  [0.007]
-0.085*** -0.032*** 0.008 0.039*** 0.071***  0.006
[0.011] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.010]  [0.005]
-0.082*** -0.020*** 0.014*** 0.058*** 0.074***  0.026***
[0.017] [0.008] [0.003] [0.008] [0.012]  [0.006]
-0.048*** -0.002 0.018*** 0.066*** 0.089***  0.043***
[0.011] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.011]  [0.005]
0.007 0.026*** 0.044*** 0.080*** 0.098***  0.069***
[0.011] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008] [0.020]  [0.007]
0.039*** 0.038*** 0.043*** 0.071*** 0.111***  0.077***
[0.008] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.021]  [0.006]
N. of Observations 457,800 457,800 457,800 457,800 457,800 457,800
N. of Individuals 46,822 46,822 46,822 46,822 46,822 46,822
Notes: Standard Errors in Parenthesis with ***,** and * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectevely. Control
variables are age, age squared, occupation dummies, firm size and area, sector and time dummies. Omitted category: non
movers in low density provinces.
Stayers living in a HD Province
Moving to a HD province:
Observed 5-10 years before a move
Moving to a LD province:
Observed 5-10 years before a move
Observed 3-4 years before a move
Observed 1-2 years before a move
Observed within a year after a move
Observed 1-2 years after a move
Observed 5-10 years after a move
Observed 3-4 years before a move
Observed 1-2 years before a move
Observed within a year after a move
Observed 1-2 years after a move
Table 2: Wage Dynamics of Migrants. Quantile Regression. 
Observed 3-4 years after a move
Observed 5-10 years after a move
Observed 3-4 years after a move
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q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 mean
- - - - -
- - - - -
-0.030*** -0.003 0.003 0.005** 0.020***  -0.005
[0.007] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005]  [0.004]
-0.063*** -0.024*** -0.011*** 0.005* 0.032***  -0.019***
[0.007] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.004]  [0.004]
-0.042*** -0.009*** 0.007*** 0.034*** 0.071***  0.008*
[0.007] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.008]  [0.005]
0.012*** 0.018*** 0.031*** 0.050*** 0.072***  0.035***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.006]  [0.005]
0.031*** 0.033*** 0.043*** 0.056*** 0.075***  0.046***
[0.005] [0.002] [0.003] [0.005] [0.009]  [0.005]
0.037*** 0.039*** 0.055*** 0.069*** 0.080***  0.058***
[0.006] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.005]  [0.005]
- - - - -
-0.019*** 0.001 0.016*** 0.029*** 0.051***  0.014***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.006]  [0.005]
-0.029*** 0.006* 0.030*** 0.052*** 0.091***  0.025***
[0.007] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.007]  [0.004]
-0.050*** 0.005 0.036*** 0.057*** 0.101***  0.030***
[0.010] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.010]  [0.005]
0.003 0.033*** 0.048*** 0.065*** 0.082***  0.044***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.006]  [0.005]
0.031*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.065*** 0.082***  0.056***
[0.007] [0.004] [0.003] [0.006] [0.008]  [0.005]
0.030*** 0.039*** 0.048*** 0.061*** 0.082***  0.050***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.006]  [0.005]
N. of Observations 457,800 457,800 457,800 457,800 457,800 457,800
N. of Individuals 46,822 46,822 46,822 46,822 46,822 46,822
Observed 1-2 years after a move
Notes: Standard Errors in Parenthesis with ***,** and * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectevely. Control variables
are age, age squared, occupation dummies, firm size and area, sector and time dummies.
Table 3: Wage Dynamics of Migrants. Quantile Fixed Effects Regression (Canay, 2011).
Stayers living in a HD Province
Moving to a HD province:
Observed 5-10 years before a move
Moving to a LD province:
Observed 5-10 years before a move
Observed 3-4 years before a move
Observed 1-2 years before a move
Observed within a year after a move
Observed 3-4 years after a move
Observed 5-10 years after a move
Observed 3-4 years after a move
Observed 5-10 years after a move
Observed 3-4 years before a move
Observed 1-2 years before a move
Observed within a year after a move
Observed 1-2 years after a move
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q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 mean
- - - - -
- - - - -
-0.023 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.005
[0.018] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006]  [0.004]
-0.066*** -0.022*** -0.01 0.005 0.031*** -0.019***
[0.019] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.012]  [0.004]
-0.049*** -0.009 0.008 0.032*** 0.065*** 0.008*
[0.013] [0.010] [0.007] [0.008] [0.012]  [0.005]
0.011 0.017 0.027*** 0.040*** 0.057*** 0.035***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.007] [0.010] [0.015]  [0.005]
0.026** 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.048*** 0.062*** 0.046***
[0.011] [0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.013]  [0.005]
0.042*** 0.041*** 0.053*** 0.065*** 0.080*** 0.058***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.017]  [0.005]
- - - - -
-0.021 -0.004 0.012** 0.023*** 0.039*** 0.014***
[0.017] [0.011] [0.005] [0.007] [0.015]  [0.005]
-0.041*** 0.002 0.028*** 0.050*** 0.083*** 0.025***
[0.015] [0.012] [0.006] [0.009] [0.011]  [0.004]
-0.056** 0.006 0.036*** 0.056*** 0.088*** 0.030***
[0.023] [0.013] [0.007] [0.008] [0.012]  [0.005]
0.005 0.037*** 0.049*** 0.060*** 0.075*** 0.044***
[0.027] [0.010] [0.007] [0.012] [0.013]  [0.005]
0.041*** 0.051*** 0.055*** 0.059*** 0.077*** 0.056***
[0.010] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.014]  [0.005]
0.039** 0.048*** 0.053*** 0.062*** 0.073*** 0.050***
[0.016] [0.010] [0.009] [0.011] [0.014]  [0.005]
N. of Observations 457,800 457,800 457,800 457,800 457,800 457,800
N. of Individuals 46,822 46,822 46,822 46,822 46,822 46,822
Observed 1-2 years after a move
Notes: Bootstrapped Standard Errors in Parenthesis with ***,** and * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectevely.
The bootstrapping was done using the entire sample and 500 iterations. Control variables are age, age squared, occupation
dummies, firm size and area, sector and time dummies.
Table 4: Wage Dynamics of Migrants. Quantile Fixed Effects Regression (Koenker, 2004). 
Stayers living in a HD Province
Moving to a HD province:
Observed 5-10 years before a move
Moving to a LD province:
Observed 5-10 years before a move
Observed 3-4 years before a move
Observed 1-2 years before a move
Observed within a year after a move
Observed 3-4 years after a move
Observed 5-10 years after a move
Observed 3-4 years after a move
Observed 5-10 years after a move
Observed 3-4 years before a move
Observed 1-2 years before a move
Observed within a year after a move
Observed 1-2 years after a move
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q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 Mean
Job-to-Job -0.036*** -0.022*** -0.008** 0.008 0.029** -0.010
[0.013] [0.004] [0.004] [0.007] [0.012] [0.007]
Tenure 0.014*** 0.004** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.011*** 0.000
[0.004] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003]
Tenure squared -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age 0.077*** 0.070*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.060*** 0.070***
[0.005] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.005]
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Firm Size 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Blue Collar Dummy -0.132*** -0.125*** -0.128*** -0.130*** -0.135*** -0.132***
[0.006] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.005] [0.021]
Constant 3.929*** 4.165*** 4.331*** 4.432*** 4.575*** 4.248***
[0.118] [0.050] [0.042] [0.032] [0.105] [0.129]
N. of Observations 8,675 8,675 8,675 8,675 8,675 8,675
N. of Individuals 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,743 1,743
Table 5: Returns to Tenure and to Job Changes. Sample of Migrants from Low to High Density
Provinces after the Migration (Canay, 2011). 
Notes: Standard Errors in Parenthesis with ***,** and * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectevely.
The other control variables are area, sector and time dummies.
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q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 mean
Job-to-Job  HD -0.013*** -0.005*** 0.005*** 0.020*** 0.039*** 0.010***
[0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
Job-to-Job  LD -0.041*** -0.025*** -0.014*** 0.000 0.016*** -0.012***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
Tenure HD 0.021*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.002*** -0.001 0.009***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Tenure squared HD -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Tenure LD 0.015*** 0.005*** -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.009*** 0.002***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Tenure squared LD -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age 0.066*** 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.054*** 0.050*** 0.059***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Age squared -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Firm Size 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.014***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Blue Collar Dummy -0.072*** -0.077*** -0.081*** -0.089*** -0.109*** -0.088***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003]
Constant 4.087*** 4.356*** 4.511*** 4.671*** 4.886*** 4.474***
[0.020] [0.011] [0.008] [0.011] [0.013] [0.020]
N. of Observations 221,549 221,549 221,549 221,549 221,549 221,549
N. of Individuals 27,771 27,772 27,773 27,774 27,775 27,776
Table 6: Returns from Tenure and Job Changes into High (HD) and Low Density (LD)
Provinces. Sample of Stayers. Quantile Fixed Effects Estimates (Canay, 2011). 
Notes: Standard Errors in Parenthesis with ***,** and * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectevely. The other control variables are area, sector and time dummies.
 
 
 
 
Stayers in LD Stayers in HD Migrants LD-HD
Overall 11.1 10.8 10.7
1th quartile 14.2 14.1 15.7
2nd quartile 10.9 10.4 11.0
3rd quartile 9.2 9.2 8.6
4th quartile 8.0 10.3 9.3
Table 7: Incidence of job changes along the quartiles of the wage
distribution. Samples of Stayers in LD, Stayers in HD, and migrants from
LD to HD after the migration.
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